In open systems, the verification of properties of subjects is crucial for authorization purposes. Very often access to resources is based on policies that express (possibly complex) requirements in terms of what are referred to variously as identity properties, attributes, or characteristics of the subject. In this paper we provide an approach that an entity called a verifier can use to evaluate queries about properties of a subject requesting resources that are relevent deciding whether the requested action is authorized. Specifically, we contribute techniques that enable reuse of previously computed query results. We consider issues related to temporal validity as well as issues related to confidentiality when one entity reuses query results computed by another entity. We employ constraint logic programming as the foundation of our policy rules and query evaluation. This provides a very general, flexible basis, and enable our work to be applied more or less directly to several existing policy frameworks. The process of evaluation of a query against a subject identity is traced through a structure, referred to as identity proof tree, that carries all information proving that a policy requirement is met.
INTRODUCTION
In open distributed systems, the verification of identity properties of subjects is a crucial task for access control. Very often access to resources is based on policies that are expressed in terms of (possibly complex) conditions against such identity properties. The evaluation of such conditions in a distributed system in which there is no central entity recording all relevant information is a challenging task. In many cases, the relying party, that is, the party providing a service and thus having to verify access control policies for service provisioning, may have to delegate to other parties in Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. the system, referred to as verifiers, the verification of (some of) the policy conditions. Delegation may be required for several reasons. For example, the information needed to verify conditions against certain identity properties of a subject is owned by a party different from the relying party; the former party may not be willing to transmit such information to the relying party but may be willing to perform the verification. Notice that a verifier may in turn delegate to other verifiers the execution of some portions of its verification tasks. Therefore, the verification process can be quite articulated and involve several verifiers, some of which may not even have direct relationships with the relying party. We believe that it is important to provide the relying party, which ultimately has to make a decision whether or not to grant access to a given resource, with a rich set of information about the verification process that has taken place. Relevant information include the policies that a verifier has applied in order to verify a certain condition, temporal validity of a verification, credentials used by a verifier. We can consider this set of information as the "provenance" information concerning the verification of conditions against some identity properties of a given subject.
In this paper we develop the notion of identity proof tree, that is, a structure encoding all information used during the process of proving conditions against the identity properties of a given subject. In the current discussion, we use standard notions from constraint logic programming (CLP) to formalize policy requirements and rules for their derivation. This enables us to handle easily such needs as chaining logical implications, as well as instantiation of and constraints on variables.
We introduce the use of a proof tree annotated with several kinds of information, based on which we provide formal techniques to verify the validity of individuals' properties. We support decentralization of proof verification, in that we do not require a single verifier to complete the process of verification, but we allow multiple entities to cooperate in the process verification. We leverage constraints to reason about time by embedding a current time variable in the characteristics and by including temporal constraints on the clauses, to trace the time during which the characteristic is valid. This aspect is of particular relevance in case of large distributed domains, where availability of up to date status information is not always possible. We thus allow multiple usage of successful validation. We enable reuse of verifications of derived characteristics by incorporating temporal values in the representation of such verifications that specify the times at which the derived characteristic is valid. Finally, by using CLP, policies can be very expressive, while specifying unambiguously and flexibly the amount of information that is authorized to be disclosed. While policies permitting release of partial information about personal properties have been proposed in the past [4] , by using CLP it is possible to achieve a much greater degree of flexibility in this regard. Specifically, arbitrary constraints can be used to state the degree of specificity a given class of recipients is authorized to receive about a given personal property. Regrettably space constraints prevent our including this privacy-related material here. The interested reader is refered to the technical report version of this paper [9] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview of our approach. In the next section we discuss our policy language, which is based on CLP. In Section 3 we elaborate on the notion of Identity proof tree, and on its properties. In Section 4 we analyze related work, while in Section 5 we conclude the paper.
CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICIES SPECIFICATION

Characteristics
In our model, both principals' characteristics and authorization policies are specified using a logic programming language based on negation-free, safe DATALOG. This guarantees that the semantics is precise, monotonic, and algorithmically tractable. We extend pure DATALOG in two ways. First constraints are added using very conservative constraint domains DATALOG C [6] and we allow extremely limited usage of lists. Both of these extensions are added in such a way as to avoid compromising tractability of query evaluation.
A characteristic has the form p(IDs, s, i, vt, t); φ in which p(IDs, s, i, vt, t) is an atomic formula that has a number of mandatory, predefined parameters, and φ is a constraint over the variables that appear in the atomic formula. It is in the first of these mandatory parameters, IDs, that lists are permitted, as we present below. Other mandatory parameters in the formula are the subject s, i.e., the principal being characterized by the characteristic, the characteristic's issuer i, i.e., the principal making the assertion about the subject and the only principal able to make such assertions in his own name, and the valid time vt, which takes on time values at which the assertion holds.
The user defined parameters, given by t, typically includes, among the other things, two temporal bounds expressing the beginning t b and the end te of the period during which the characteristic is valid. These values are represented as date expressions of the form mm/dd/yy:hh. The value of t e can also be ∞, with the obvious intended meaning.
The first of the predefined parameters, IDs, is a list containing the serial numbers of clauses used in the derivation of the characteristic. When a previously verified characteristic is to be reused at a later time, it is sufficient to ensure that none of the clauses having these serial numbers has been revoked to ensure that the the characteristic has not been invalidated by revocation. The list is constructed by using a programming idiom common in Prolog called difference lists [8] . Because the values in the list are not used or manipulated during the course of computation, but rather serve only to record the clauses that participate in deriving a characteristic, their usage does not affect the assymtotic complexity of solving queries. 
Policy statements
A policy statement in our language is a DATALOG C clause in which the atomic formulas are characteristics.We use P to denote the set of DATALOG C clauses representing policy statements that are valid (i.e., issued, but neither expired nor revoked) at a given point in time. 
Similarly, only the entity that speaks for the authority of Department of Motor Vehicles could create the following clause defining eligibility to receive a Driver License:
The management of the list of serial numbers in the first parameter can be performed automatically, though space limitations prevent our presenting this here. In the remainder of this paper, with the exception of Section 3.3 where managing revocation is discussed, we omit this parameter from example clauses.
Policies are used to control access to objects and to express conditions against the identity properties of the subjects. A relying party associates with each protected object under her control a combination of characteristics sufficient to authorize access to the object. Note that the relying party may be the issuer defining the characteristics that grant access, or she may delegate this authority to others.
IDENTITY PROOF TREES
In this section we introduce the notion of Identity Proof Tree, a structure encoding all information used in the proof that required conditions are met by the identity properties of a given subject.
Identity Proof Tree
We assume that for each entity and each point in time, there is a well defined set of valid (neither expired nor revoked) credentials in the system that are available to the entity at that time. The current policy state P is defined to be the set of clauses carried by valid credentials.
We organize the derivation of a characteristic from the current policy state P in a structure that we call an identity proof tree (IpT). In practice, IpTs form the basis for making authorization decisions. In fact, to evaluate a query for an action a on object o, we check whether or not an identity proof tree for a query can be constructed from P. Identity proof trees are defined as follows. 
There is one exception: the constraint labeling the root can be stronger, reflecting constraints appearing in the top-level query.
We select the components from a given node n by writing n.UpL, n.LoL, and n.Const.
• R = UpL, LoL, Const is the root of the tree. The constraint labeling the root is the same as for other nodes, except that an additional constraint can be included, representing a constraint on the characteristic in a query.
• E (the set of directed edges). Each e ∈ E is an ordered pair e = n 1 , n 2 , with n 1 , n 2 ∈ N representing that n 1 is the parent of n 2 and n 2 is a child of n 1 . For each node n such that n.LoL = ⊥, there exists a renaming variant H ← L1, . . . , L ; φ of some clause in P, such that n.LoL = H and n has exactly children whose upper labels are L 1 , . . . , L , respectively.
The root of an IpT has as its upper label a characteristic, which is typically a query that decides authorization for some action. If the lower label of a node n is not ⊥, n is said to be closed. Note that the constraint labeling a node can refer to variables that do not appear in the upper or lower label of the node, but rather in the upper label of one of the node's children. The clause variants used in the tree must not share any variables with one another and the set of constraints labeling nodes in the tree must be consistent (i.e., satisfiable). The tree T is consistent if there is a valuation of variables that satisfies all constraints in the tree.
When an IpT T contains only closed nodes, we call T closed. In this case, T represents a complete proof that the upper label of the root holds for all valuations of the variables that satisfy all constraints in T . More precisely, the upper label of the root holds for all valuations that satisfy the constraint ∃x. ∧n∈T .N n.Const, in which the tuple x comprises the variables appearing in the upper label of the root 2 . Given an action a, an object o, and a principal s, if a relying party verifies the correctness of a closed IpT T based on P, then she knows that s is authorized for action a on object o.
Decentralized Identity Proof Trees
We now consider how a relying party can gain reasonable assurance that s is authorized for a by making use of verifications performed by others and without having to verify the correctness of the entire IpT herself. In the simplest case, this is achieved if a verifier, trusted by the relying party, checks that such an IpT exists, and simply reports to the relying party that s satisfies the characteristic. To generalize this, notice that a large closed IpT can be viewed as being composed of several smaller IpTs, some of which may not be closed. Two IpTs can be combined into one if a non-closed node in one has the same upper label as the root of the other and the combined constraint set is consistent (including the ∧s i = t i parameter passing constraints). In this case the former node is simply replaced by the root of the other tree. Some renaming of variables may be necessary to satisfy the requirement that the clause variants that define parent/child relationships in the tree do not share variables with one another. This observation can be used by a relying party to enable her to make use of IpTs constructed previously and/or by a third party. Now further observe that any IpT T can be summarized by a single clause, also called summary clause. We can now enable the relying party to make use of these summary clauses that are generated by verifiers that the relying party trusts to faithfully construct IpTs and summary clauses. In this way, the relying party can avoid repeating work performed by the trusted verifier. She can also construct valid derivations of authorizations in some cases where her own lack of authorization to receive certain policy rules or credentials would otherwise prevent her doing so. This is because another verifier, authorized to receive the protected policy rules or credentials, can construct an IpT using them, and then make the summarizing clause available to the relying party.
Timeliness of Identity Proof Trees
The validity of credentials carrying clauses used to construct an IpT is checked when they are received or when the IpT is constructed. Their validity at the time the IpT is used is not essential. This is because the credential is just a secure conveyance of the characteristic, and the validity of the characteristics inferred by using such clauses is not dependent on the validity of the conveyance. What is essential is that clauses composing the IpT are valid when the IpT is used for authorization purposes.
IpTs carry information on their temporal validity status. This information is of particular importance when a significant amount of time elapses between the validation time and the time the derived characteristic is used for authorization purposes. The temporal validity of an IpT is influenced by the lifetime of the characteristics that label its nodes. The management of validity time of characteristics is ultimately determined by the semantics of the characteristics themselves. For instance, in order to have a current status as a military veteran, it is necessary only to have been in the military at some point in the past, not to be in the military now. At the time an authorization decision must be made by determining whether the requester has a given characteristic, the authorization should be granted just in case the characteristic holds at the current time. It is quite straightforward to require that supporting charac-teristics appearing in the body of some clause used to construct the IpT must be valid for the characteristic in the head of such a clause to be valid. If the characteristic labeling the root of the tree has time interval parameters, their values are determined by the clauses used for building the tree itself. The semantics of characteristic validity periods is quite variable, and must be specified in the clauses by the policy authors. Unlike expiration, revocation is unpredictable and can happen at any time. A characteristic may be revoked, invalidating the authorization decision based on the tree in which it appears, even if the characteristic's temporal validity interval has not elapsed. Revocation is handled by the characteristics' issuers, which publish and maintains updated characteristics' revocation lists, listing the serial number of revoked characteristics.
To prevent the relying party from using revoked characteristics, a verifier, while sending the summary clause to the relying party, can send along the serial number of the clauses in the tree that are subject to revocation, without disclosing the actual characteristics. The recipient, once informed of such numbers, can contact appropriate credential-status servers to determine whether the clauses with those numbers have been revoked. We assume that serial numbers do not reveal the clauses they denote.
For example, suppose the characteristics appearing in the body of the clause of Example 3 are verified. The serial numbers of all the clauses used in the derivation are automatically accumulated in the first parameter of the characteristic Contributor(diff(SerialList, []), s, JohnsHopkins, i, vt B ). When this information is shared with other relying parties, the recipient has the opportunity to utilize revocation publication services or similar means to determine whether any of the clauses used in the derivation have been revoked. If none have, then the derivation remains valid.
RELATED WORK
Our research stands at the crossroads of different research areas, such as digital identity management, authorization and trust management systems and declarative logic proof trees. In this section we shortly overview related work closest to ours.
In recent years, a number of researchers have developed sophisticated access control models in which access control requirements may be expressed by using rules that are employed to reason about authorized forms of access (see, for example, [2] , [1] , and [6] ). In these approaches, access to resources are expressed by using rules that define the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a permission/ denial/authorization to hold.
Another significant related work is represented by Delegation Logic [5] . Delegation logic is a logic-based language to represent policies, credentials, and requests in distributed authorization. Delegation logic extends Datalog with expressive delegation constructs that feature delegation depth and a wide variety of complex principals. It is based on model-theoretic semantics and has further been extended to support non-monotonicity, negation and prioritized conflict handling. SD3 [3] is an inference engine for a trust management system that constructs a proof tree for a given query so that the querier can verify the correctness of the query result.
Proof Trees have been used in previous work for authorization purposes. In particular, our work borrows some ideas from that of Minami and Kotz [7] . The authors propose a secure contextsensitive authorization system that protects confidential information in facts or rules. Our approach follows a similar philosophy, but we differ along several dimensions. First, we base our syntax on constraint Datalog, while the authors in [7] use simple logic rules. The use of constraints in policy statements allows for fine-grained control of structured characteristics, and thus ensure higher expressiveness than simple logic rules. Additionally, constraints provide a method to protect information about attribute values differentially depending on the precision of that information. Finally, Minami's work does not deal with the timeliness of the validation.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we provide an approach according to which an entity, referred to as verifier, can satisfy a query proving some property related to the identity of a subject. Our system is not intended to be a concrete representation for exchange of identity proof trees, and a suitable one is certainly needed. As future work, we plan to elaborate a precise computational model defining how multiple verifiers, services providers, issuers cooperate for information exchange. Subsequently, we will develop an XML-based protocol to support the exchange of proof steps.
